| 摘要: |
| 近期学者对贸易保护待售模型的经验研究均显示，政府赋予社会福利的相对权重a相对较高，而标准的贸易保护待售模型无法对此进行解释。本文通过将“多代理人共同代理”模型引入到Grossman和Helpman (1994)的分析框架，考察了多数制下政府规模对均衡贸易保护水平的影响，并解决了上述问题。分析表明:由于利益集团需要把政治捐资在多个代理人之间进行分配，政策制定机构规模越大，单个代理人平均获得的政治捐资也就越少，因此贸易保护水平与政策制定机构的规模呈反相关关系。 |
| 关键词: 多代理人 共同代理 多数制 贸易保护代售 |
| DOI： |
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| Government Size and the Political Economy of Trade Policy:Protection for Sale with Multiple Agents |
| WANG Yong-jin |
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| Abstract: |
| Recent empirical studies based on the protection for sale model show that the government puts a rather large weight on social welfare, which is in sharp contrast with the standard protection for sale model. This paper incorporates the“multiple principal multiple agent”model developed by Prat and Rustichini (2003) into the framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994), and investigates the effect of political organization on trade protection level, which successfully solves the above problem. Furthermore, the theoretic model shows that, as the size of government institutions increases, trade protection level will decrease because political contributions from the interest groups will then be allocated between more agents. |
| Key words: multiple agent common agency majority voting protection for sale |
